Puffy-eyed and hoarse, the president was leaving
behind one mess - a Middle East peace process
barely on life support - and flying home to another,
the scheduled House debate on impeachment.

On that gloomy 12-hour flight home - as wife
Hillary and daughter Chelsea slept in the forward
cabin of the giant 747 aircraft - William Jefferson
Clinton embarked on the ultimate high-wire act of
his roller-coaster presidency.

Somewhere over Europe, the president, with his
life's work hanging in the balance, shook off his
weariness and his private demons to convene a
meeting with top military and national security
officials aboard the plane and over secure
telephone links to Washington.

Decisions made at that unusual airborne meeting
set into motion Operation Desert Fox, which less
than 24 hours later resulted in a massive air
campaign aimed at the heart of Saddam Hussein's
arsenal of weapons of mass destruction.

The timing of the largest military operation of
Clinton's six years in office could not have been
more controversial, and it would lead to howls
from the pundits about whether this was a
desperate "Wag the Dog" scenario to save his
presidency.

When Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Del.) was briefed on
the mission Wednesday morning by National
Security Adviser Sandy Berger, Biden was asked
how bad he expected the political storm to be.

"The president should put on his raincoat," Biden
told Berger.

Administration officials insist the decision to strike
Iraq was the culmination of events set in motion by
Iraq's actions a month earlier and that the timing
was determined by the actions of U.N. weapons
inspectors in Baghdad - as well as the reaction of
Saddam.

For Clinton, who repeatedly has shown a capacity
to juggle personal crises with the enormous
burden of his office, the decision was, one insider
said, "a relatively simple one."

"Everything just fell into place," the adviser said.

The massive air campaign was 13 months in the
making; the result of simmering tension between
the U.S. and Iraq over the ability of U.N. weapons
inspectors to perform their duties - with the
mercurial Saddam dramatically escalating the
stakes in the cat-and-mouse game he's been
playing since the end of the Gulf War.

Three times during that period, Clinton came close
to ordering air attacks - only to back down after
Saddam blinked and capitulated to U.N. demands.

In early November, Saddam raised the stakes
again. Perhaps sensing a weakness with Clinton
pre-occupied with the impeachment debate in
Congress, Iraq once again began blocking U.N.
teams from doing their work.

More alarming were communications intercepted
by National Security Agency listening posts in
which Saddam was ordering commanders to beef
up defenses around key installations and preparing
Iraqi National Guard units in southern Iraq to attack
Kuwait 48 hours after a U.S. air attack.

Saddam, desperate to escape the sanctions
imposed on him in the aftermath of Operation
Desert Storm, appeared to be gearing up for a
sustained period of confrontation with what he
believed was a severely weakened American
leadership.

Despite his troubles, the president decided to act
decisively.

In early November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
presented him with two attack scenarios.

"One was big, the other was huge," one Pentagon
official said.

On Nov. 14, U.S. forces in the Gulf region were 30
minutes from launching an assault when Saddam
again stepped back from the brink and agreed to
cooperate with U.N. weapons inspectors.

The White House wasn't convinced and believed
another war with Iraq was inevitable.

But Clinton stopped the military operation with the
understanding that if Saddam reneged again on
Dec. 15, "then the 16th was the day we should go
in," said Gen. Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.

The White House then put the rest of the issue in
the hands of Richard Butler, the chief inspector for
the U.N. Special Commission.

His job was to play unbiased judge and be the
ultimate "triggering authority" for airstrikes.

When U.N. inspection teams returned to Baghdad
on Nov. 17, they had an aggressive agenda. They
demanded documents as well as an explanation
for the presence of traces of VX nerve gas
discovered on fragments of a recently tested
missile warhead.

Both requests were turned down by Iraq's deputy
foreign minister, Riyadh al Qaysi.

On Nov. 23, an Iraqi helicopter buzzed the U.N.
team's chopper - coming within 10 meters of it.
Butler's deputy, Charles Duelfer, called it a "threat
to the safety of U.N. personnel."

On Dec. 4, Iraqi security wouldn't let the
inspectors go anywhere because it was a Friday,
the Muslim day of rest - even though inspectors
have been allowed to work Fridays since 1991.

On Dec. 9, the UNSCOM team was blocked from
inspecting the Baath party headquarters, where
components of Scud missiles were thought to be
stored. Iraqi security later relented, but said only
four inspectors would be allowed inside. Butler
called off the inspection.

The Clinton administration was kept informed of
Butler's activities throughout the month but said it
awaited his final report to the U.N. Security Council
before acting.

At 5:30 p.m. Tuesday, Butler went to the 38th floor
of the U.N. secretariat building.

There, in a grand office overlooking the East River,
Butler delivered a 10-page report to U.N. Secretary
General Kofi Annan concluding that Saddam was
once again placing restrictions on UNSCOM's
ability to operate inside Iraq.

Annan forwarded the report to the Security
Council. Attached was a cover letter from Annan
containing three diplomatic options: rule that one
month was not a long enough period; determine
that Iraq had not cooperated but should be given
more time; or undertake a "comprehensive review"
of the Iraqi disarmament program.

But Annan's diplomatic solutions were about to be
completely ignored.

At that moment, 37,000 feet above Europe, the
president and his aides were meeting to discuss
military plans.

With him aboard Air Force One were Berger and
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.

At the other end of the secure phone link in
Washington were Vice President Al Gore, Defense
Secretary William Cohen and White House Chief
of Staff John Podesta.

The president decided early he wanted minimal
casualties.

Operation Desert Fox's aim was to eliminate
Saddam's ability to threaten his neighbors with
chemical or biological weapons, he said.

It would also weaken Saddam's grip on power with
bombings of headquarters of the elite Republican
Guards, Pentagon officials said.

But Iraq has shown a remarkable ability to hide
weapons components in civilian areas.

Pentagon officials selected more than 200
potential targets - including airstrips and buildings
where "delivery systems" like missiles and
manufacturing facilities are located.

Also on the list of targets are Iraq's intelligence
headquarters in Baghdad, a missile
design-and-production facility in Al Taji, the
headquarters of Iraq's Special Security Service,
responsible for guarding Saddam and three of his
10 palaces scattered around the country that were
thought to be hiding places for chemical-weapon
components.

The president signed off on the plans with the
understanding he would have 24 hours to call off
the operation.

At midnight, the president arrived at the White
House from his overseas flight and held another
meeting with Berger and Podesta.

White House officials say they discussed the other
nettlesome problem: the timing of the airstrikes -
and how it would be perceived, coming so close to
the big impeachment debate.

The president decided that the political fix he was
in would neither be improved or worsened by the
airstrikes.

"In the end, it came down to doing what he felt was
the right thing to do. It had to be decided on the
merits. The president would do the best he could
do and explain his decision," said a White House
official.

Clinton stayed up until 1:30 a.m. briefing stunned
congressional leaders on the impending attacks.

In New York, Annan also received an ominous
late-night phone call from U.S. Ambassador Peter
Burleigh, who recommended immediate
evacuation of UNSCOM inspectors.

The U.S., with logistical support from Britain and
tacit support from Middle East allies, would be
going at Iraq alone - without sanction from the U.N.
Security Council and knowing opposition would
come from former Gulf War allies Russia and
France.

At 7:30 a.m. Wednesday, the president joined his
national security advisers in the White House
Situation Room on the ground floor of the White
House, where he made it clear Operation Desert
Fox still had the green light.

With zero hour approaching, the president spent
the day getting updates from Berger on the military
operations and phoning congressional leaders to
discuss the plans.

Although House Speaker-elect Robert Livingston
(R-La.) agreed to postpone the impeachment vote,
many Republican leaders were outraged.

Just before 5 p.m., Clinton and White House aides
huddled around TV sets watching live reports of
the skies over Baghdad lighting up.

At 6 p.m., Clinton addressed the nation
demonstrating once again that steely
determination of his to be presidential against all
odds.

-- Niles Lathem - 12/17/98